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1. Introduction
What are the possible advantages and handicaps of implementing an inflation target 
(IT) regime? This paper aims to contribute to this debate and, in doing so it takes on a Post-
Keynesian and, thus, an institutional stance. It is Post-Keynesian as long as it does not 
perceive any benefit in the mainstream split between monetary and fiscal policies (Keynes,
1936). And it is institutional insofar as it assumes that there are several ways of implementing 
a policy, such that the chosen one is determined by historical factors, as it will be illustrated 
by the Brazilian case.
As a matter of fact, we could even support IT policies if their targets were seen just as 
“focusing devices” guiding economic policy, notwithstanding other targets, as, chiefly – in 
the short run – output growth and employment and – in the long run – technology and human 
development (Wray, 1998; Bibow, 2005). Nevertheless, we must underline that an inflation 
target is not necessary, although it can be admitted, mainly if that target is kept hidden from 
the public, in order to increase the flexibility of the Central Bank (CB). For, in that case, the 
CB has no obligation to achieve any previously publicized target.
In such an example, we would have an implicit target, as some authors say is the 
current institutionality followed by the Federal Reserve (FED-USA). That does not mean that 
the FED could not be more flexible or more growth biased when implementing its monetary 
policies. But only that the FED is more flexible to attain its several aims if those inflation 
targets are not made explicit (Bibow, 2005; Johnson, 2005).
In that sense, it is important to highlight that currently it is still not possible to 
determine if countries which follow an IT have lower inflation and output variability than 
those which do not (Bernanke et al., 1999:6-7). However, some economists, even Post-
Keynesians and/or heterodox economists (Arestis et al., 2002; Bibow, 2005), try to 
demonstrate empirically that IT can provide better results than other sets of policies, for 
instance, in terms of inflation volatility reduction and output-gap fluctuations, despite some 
opposing data and opinions (Muscatelli et al., 2002). Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2002:182-3) affirm that IT helps countries to achieve lower inflation rates than they would in 
the absence of this regime, in spite of not yielding inflation below the rates of developed 
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2countries (DCs) which did not opt for IT; produces stronger capabilities to stand shocks; and 
reduces inflation persistence, turning expectations and policy making more forward looking 
and weakening the weight of the past (Vega and Winkelried, 2005:12).
Be as it may, in our view, it is essential that the policies chosen and the corresponding 
institutional framework must be flexible enough to achieve or approximate full employment, 
as well as look for low inflation rates (Svensson, 2005). This is why it is also important to 
stress the different possibilities concerning IT regimes and their institutionality. Such 
possibilities show us the extreme relevance of studying and understanding the impact of IT on 
the behavior and performance of economies. Moreover, in most of the IT debate there is a 
neglect of the relevance of institutional and historical roots for the design of policies in real 
cases.
We will deal theoretically and empirically with this disregard when presenting some of 
the main characteristics of IT implementation in Brazil. Just to mention what may be the most 
important aspect, we underscore the high interest rates long before and after IT 
implementation, in an example of predominance of financial interests producing the highest 
real interest rates in the world for a long time. Therefore, very ambitious inflation targets 
seem to be not adequate to a still quite indexed economy (chiefly when considered privatized 
utilities prices; Fraga et al., 2003), with very liquid financial assets (mainly public debt), 
fiscal dominance (Blanchard, 2004) and liable to Balance of Payments (BP) shocks. This 
implies in a pernicious bias toward a mix of very high interest rates (to achieve the inflation 
targets and to manage some of the BP problems), huge public debt and its service costs, with 
little attention to this fiscal dominance and to the possibility of a more coordinated procedure 
among fiscal and monetary authorities.
In this paper, institutions are defined as rules and patterns of behavior or interaction 
among people verified in one (or part of a) society, rules and patterns which must acquire 
some stability, i.e., need to be repeated, even for a short time span. That is to say, institutions 
set up and restrict the choices of individuals – together with some ways of rewarding and with 
sanctions against deviating behavior – tightening what is socially recognized or considered 
acceptable and/or rational (Strachman and Vasconcelos, 2001). This does not mean that these 
individuals must be conscious of these norms and rules or of their meaning or function
(Elster, 1989:99; Runde et al., 2005).
The paper is structured as following. In Section 2, we consider the main aspects of IT 
regimes, their rationality and the evidence supporting (or not) the preference for this kind of 
regimes. Section 3 explains the main rationale underpinning the adoption of IT in Brazil, and 
3its specific institutional framework. In Section 4, we present some consequences for these 
choices. And in Section 5, we conclude briefly.
2. The Main Aspects of IT Regimes
In spite of remarks of many (monetary) policy-makers, e.g. Bernanke et al. (1999:ix), 
that “monetary policy is notoriously an art rather than a science…”, many practitioners insist 
to be excessively rigid in their prescriptions and in the policies which they follow (Greenspan,
2004). Would that be because of a flaw of the theories – “more art than science”– would 
demand strictness for some authors and/or practitioners, since one might try to equalize 
strictness to the pretense to be or seem scientific as a result of a feeble science? Or would that 
be a consequence of the general (institutional) environment in which these policies are 
implemented, with some environments requiring much more stringency than others? And in 
the specific case of IT, why do some countries try to achieve very low inflation rates despite 
many obstacles and lots of “market imperfections”, making this pursuit a serious hindrance to 
economic growth and development? We should always keep in mind that the very 
commonsensical trade-off between inflation and growth is just not always true (Chick, 
1983:339; Bibow, 2005). In this paper, we will try to give some hints for these questions. 
However, we will focus in the analysis of IT regimes, not in monetary policy in general, for 
this would be beyond the scope of this paper. First, we need to know what IT is.
“Inflation targeting is a framework for monetary policy characterized by the public 
announcement of official quantitative targets (or target ranges) for the inflation rate over one 
or more time horizons, and by explicit acknowledgement that low, stable inflation is monetary 
policy’s primary long-run goal. Among other important features of inflation targeting are 
vigorous efforts to communicate with the public about the plans and objectives of the 
monetary authorities, and, in many cases, mechanisms that strengthen the central bank’s 
accountability for attaining those objectives” (Bernanke et al., 1999:4; see also Svensson, 
2005:1). However, these same important supporters of IT regimes stress that IT is a 
framework not a rule for monetary policy, meaning that IT gives leeway to constrained 
discretion, in contrast with immutable rules (Bernanke et al., 1999:5-6; Greenspan, 2004). 
Constrained discretion shall be understood as “a conceptual structure and its inherent 
discipline on the central bank, but without eliminating all flexibility, [thus] inflation targeting 
combines some of the advantages traditionally ascribed to rules with those ascribed to 
discretion” (Bernanke et al., 1999:6, emphases in the original).
4Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002:174) state that “full-fledged inflation targeting is 
based on five pillars: absence of other nominal anchors, an institutional commitment to price 
stability, absence of fiscal dominance, policy instrument independence, and policy 
transparency and accountability. While the second through the fifth of these pillars are 
necessary for effective conduct of monetary policy under any regime, they are particularly 
important prerequisites for effective policy under inflation targeting” (our emphases). For 
Mahadeva and Sterne (2002:624, n.12) other definitions of IT also underline the absence of 
other explicit targets. Nevertheless, Svensson (2005:1-3) includes at least an explicit concern 
with output stability and growth besides the more obvious one with a low and stable inflation, 
as well as explicit decisions over projections of target variables (“forecast targeting”) and the 
instrument rate (the short nominal interest rate) to reach those targets.
The rationale supporting IT regimes rests on three main arguments: 1) economists and 
policy-makers are nowadays less confident in the capability of monetary policy (and 
economic policy, as a whole) to soften short run fluctuations in the economy without bad 
effects in the long run, except in cases of huge oscillations. Therefore, when monetary policy-
makers determine that a low inflation rate is their main goal they would just be accepting the 
reality of what monetary policy can or cannot do, according to mainstream; 2) there is now 
almost a consensus that even moderate inflation rates can be very harmful to economic 
growth and efficiency, and, consequently, that low and stable rates of inflation are important 
for attaining other economic aims, in addition to being a prerequisite for an economic growth 
commanded by the private sector (a market-driven growth; Arestis et al., 2002:528); and 3) IT 
would propitiate a simpler framework for the policy-makers to communicate their intentions 
and measures with the public as well as to provide “some degree of accountability and 
discipline on the central bank and on the government itself” (Bernanke et al., 1999:10).
An IT would then serve as a nominal anchor for monetary policy. For example, it 
would consider only secondarily goals other than short run inflation stabilization, even in 
Svensson’s (2005) definition, and thus the policy-makers would need to present “consistency 
and rationality… that they might not otherwise exhibit” (Bernanke et al., 1999:11). Moreover, 
IT can convey transparency and also flexibility to the general public (Svensson, 2005:1-2,15-
7,20). A main issue is, of course, to combine these two characteristics of economic policies 
which are most of the time contradictory, since the most transparent policies are by and large 
non-contingent, in the sense that a sudden need to change policies because of a demand or 
supply shock must lead to precise and previously specified actions and be clearly transmitted 
to the public. On the other hand, flexibility requires that the CB ought to devise good 
5measures to respond to some unforeseen events (Bernanke et al., 1999:26-7; Greenspan, 
2004), i.e., transparency relates mainly with how to treat ex-ante events, while flexibility 
concerns how to respond wisely ex-post to these same occurrences.
We can append two comments to these three arguments: a) why should monetary or 
economic policy be constricted to the short run with no results in the long term? Why accept 
the Friedmanian statement that Phillips curve has an upward slope in the short run, but is 
vertical in the long run at NAIRU, or at a similar supply-side concept, as, for example, the 
output gap (Bernanke et al., 1999:13-4; Kriesler and Lavoie, 2004)? For if inflation is harmful 
in the short run but meaningless in the long run, why would a policy-maker bother with 
policy-making, since in the long run everything would reach its natural equilibrium, even the 
growth rate? But which are these natural rates? Those, for instance, of Brazil, a little more 
than a 2% annual average economic growth rate, over a decade of low inflation rates or even 
considering the last 25 years, or circa 7% in the 50 years from 1930 to 1980? Or those of 
China, something close to an average annual growth of 9 to 10% over the same period, 
depending on the data source? Does these data not make clear that the long run may be the 
result of successive “short runs”? 
We know, of course, the deleterious effects of high inflation rates whether on the short 
or long runs.2 But these do not take us “naturally” to the totally opposite position, that any 
inflation rate, even low, is harmful and should be controlled with relentless effort, even that of 
permanent low economic growth and development. Indeed, what seems to be undeniable is 
the current death of the commitment, mainly by the mainstream, with full employment, 
although there is still a commitment, at least by some authors, with a satisfactory rate of 
employment (Greenspan, 2004). As asserted by Bernanke et al. (1999:16): “[t]o forestall 
confusion: Our criticisms of ‘policy activism’ does not imply that policy-makers should be 
reluctant to move the policy levers, but rather that doing so in an attempt to maintain 
continuous full employment is likely to be counterproductive. Indeed, a focus on price 
stability, as implied by the inflation-targeting approach, may require active manipulation of 
monetary policy instruments.” Furthermore, economic policies at large, including monetary 
policies, have important effects on output and employment, both in the short and long runs; 
potential output is not directly observable, making impossible any rather precise 
determination of the output gap; investment and the ensuing variation of the capacity (growth) 
level and capacity utilization are all determined endogenously, as explained long ago by 
Kalecki and Keynes (Chick, 1983); and, finally, there is no NAIRU and no supply-determined 
natural growth rate (Kriesler and Lavoie, 2004:6-8; Arestis and Sawyer, 2003:12). Instead, 
6any “natural” rate of growth is determined by the actual rate of growth (Chick, 1983) and the 
combined behavior of demand and supply which make this growth happen.
And b) why is it so important for the monetary policies to be understood by the public, 
in order to provide “a focus for the expectations of financial markets and the general public” 
(Bernanke et al., 1999:11)? Albeit it would be very relevant that people should understand the 
economic policies which affect their own living, this is not the same as stressing that a 
simpler way of making policies and communicating them to the public implies that IT is the 
policy to be adopted. We are well aware that IT is not the worst policy set in the current 
macroeconomic theory shelves. For at least in many cases, IT policies, explicit or implicit 
(Greenspan, 2004), seem to be theoretically and empirically rather concerned with 
employment, as, for instance, in the cases of the US and the UK, in stark comparison to the 
examples of Germany (pre EU), EU and, of course, Brazil (Bernanke et al., 1999; Bibow, 
2005; Johnson, 2005). Nevertheless, we could offer a sort of list that would go, on one end, 
from policies explicitly concerned with full employment as their main objective, as in Wray 
(1998), to policies that follow a kind of double or triple goal (inflation, employment and 
economic growth), and to, on the other end, IT regimes (almost) entirely focused on inflation 
rates, etc.
In addition to those general themes concerning IT, however, there are also some 
operational issues. First, what measure of inflation should be used, i.e., what should be 
defined as the target, for instance, headline inflation or core inflation? Here again there is a 
trade-off between transparency and flexibility. A full price index, one with which people are 
acquainted and which is also broad-based and accurate, scores the highest in terms of 
transparency.3 Nevertheless, an index which excludes price modifications in specific sectors 
and “one-time price jumps that are unlikely to affect trend or ‘core’ inflation – for example, a 
rise in a value added tax or in a sales tax” (Bernanke et al., 1999:27) – would be the best 
choice regarding flexibility.
The chosen index, thus, should at least be isolated from the first-round effects of price 
changes in items such as food and energy, because of their vulnerability to supply shocks. The 
specification ex-ante of items which will be outside core inflation has the advantage of 
allowing no discretion for economic authorities to change prices indexes after a supply shock, 
preserving credibility. That is why they are more common than escape clauses (Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002:185). Furthermore, Arestis et al. (2002:531) show many problems 
connected with the choice of headline inflation, since in the presence of sticky prices and 
price shocks, targeting headline inflation can severely destabilize the output growth. For 
7monetary authorities ought to try to compensate the effects of well-known ex-ante or ex-post
price shocks on headline inflation, by means of changes in the opposite direction in some of 
the sticky prices of the economy, usually with important reductions of the supply and/or 
demand in many markets (of goods, services, labor, etc.).
Second, what nominal value should the policy-makers choose for the target? One 
answer, not very practical, since it does not give a clear guidance, is a inflation rate so low 
that no agent would have to consider it in her/his decisions (Bernanke et al., 1999). However, 
a very low inflation rate is not recommended for several reasons, as the difficulties to lower 
nominal interest rates in an eventual recession; risk of real deflation and the ensuing risks of 
liquidity and solvency problems. This explains the reasons why the majority or all CBs in 
DCs target rates from 1% to 3% per annum, i.e., an IT has a ceiling as well as a floor for the 
inflation rate, and the economic authorities shall heed deflations as well as high inflation 
rates. Moreover, CBs should also not be excessively obsessed with inflation rates at the 
expenses of output stability, for this can make them lose the public support.
Nevertheless, what should be the inflation targets in developing countries (DEVCs)? 
The same as those in developed ones? For there are many market imperfections in DEVCs, as 
potential or real shortage of supply of goods and services in many sectors and/or of foreign 
exchange, which can breed a higher inflation bias than in DCs. The process of trying to 
overcome these supply shortages by means of investment can generate a demand inflation 
bias which should be tolerated in order not to dampen the very process of economic 
development. Consequently, the benefits of an obsession with low inflation are unclear for 
DEVCs. As Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2004:2) expound, there are theoretical and empirical 
arguments showing that transitory but frequent changes in the level of aggregate demand may 
have permanent consequences on output and employment. According to Chang and Grabel 
(2004:185), “[n]umerous empirical studies suggest that moderate levels of inflation (which, 
depending on the study, range from 10 to 40 per cent) have little or no cost in terms of 
economic growth. These studies find that the economic costs of inflation are introduced only 
at very high levels of inflation (by which is meant inflation rates above 40 per cent per year). 
It is noticeable that this conclusion is shared by Robert Barro…”. Hence, there seems to be no 
costs for inflation rates under 20 per cent in DEVCs, in terms of long run growth, investment 
and inflows of FDI. Furthermore, annual inflation rates from 15 to 30 per cent can be 
sustained for a long time, and Colombia and mainly Brazil are clear examples of this behavior
(Chang and Grabel, 2004:186).
8Notwithstanding, the main issue is whether and when this inflation rate starts to be 
uncontrollable and begins to jump to levels above an annual maximum ceiling of, say, 40 or 
50 per cent. In such cases and after long periods of unrestrained inflation, what should be the 
target or the maximum accepted inflation rate of an IT policy-maker or even of a non-IT one? 
We agree that after long periods of high inflation it is important to achieve credibility about 
price stability, in order to reduce uncertainty about inflation, returns on productive and 
financial investments, real exchange rates, etc. However, DEVCs are still prone to more 
instability than DCs, for the reasons stressed before, to which we should add the quite 
common foreign exchange crises these countries have been periodically subjected to. Hence, 
DEVCs should opt for higher inflation targets than DCs.4
Third, what should be the relevant time horizon? Bernanke et al. (1999:31) assert that 
ITs set beyond a range that goes from one to four years are meaningless, since either the time 
horizon would be too short, not giving enough leeway for the policies to achieve their aims, or 
too long, imparting little credibility to targets, policies and authorities. More flexible ways to 
achieve the targets are not to use calendar years for the inflation rates, but only cumulative 
months – for instance, the last 12 or 24 months – as in many countries. Furthermore, many 
CBs choose multi-year annual targets, such that inflation rates can gradually approach the 
targets (in the short, medium and long runs). Another alternative is to announce only a long 
run target and publish short and medium term inflation forecasts for future years, thus 
describing the expected inflation path toward the long term target, like in some DCs and in 
Chile. Svennson (2005) supports the idea of, at least in some cases, not fixing a rigid time 
horizon at which an inflation target should be met. He prefers instead to change it for an 
explicit intertemporal loss function, which would lead to an aim to minimize the ex-ante sum, 
through a determined period, of a composition between low levels of inflation and the lower 
achievable output gap.
Fourth, should the target be a point or a range? Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2004:18-
20) have a strong case in favor of a quite wide range, so that the monetary authorities will 
choose more inflation volatility and less output volatility, not easily sacrificing output for 
gains in inflation rates. In this same sense, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002:186) 
emphasize the dangerous effects of mixing a too short time horizon with a narrow target, 
resulting in undesired output fluctuations. A too narrow range reduces CBs possibility to 
respond with minor adverse outcomes (output and employment variation) to unforeseen 
events, including inevitable errors in controlling inflation in spite of their best efforts, which 
can even drive actual rates outside this narrow range. Moreover, the damage to credibility of 
9missing an entire range is greater than that of missing a point, albeit these point targets are 
always accompanied by a range. Furthermore, through a widening of the target range, CBs 
would convey the unavoidable uncertainty surrounding IT and monetary policy (Greenspan, 
2004) which would even support, according to some authors, ranges of 5 or 6 percent 
(Bernanke, 1999:32). However, once more, choosing a very wide range for the target can 
indicate a feeble commitment of a CB to low inflation rates, reducing its credibility.
This leads us to our fifth point: under which conditions should deviations from the 
target be permitted? Mahadeva and Sterne (2002) stress that, overall, escape clauses should be 
circumstance-specific and established ex-ante, making clear that the economic authorities are 
strictly following the rules. New Zealand incorporated formal escape clauses, allowing misses 
of the target range when there are significant supply shocks, as in terms of trade, changes in 
indirect taxes, and so on. Note that escape clauses are acquiesced only as reaction to supply 
shocks since, according to mainstream, these shocks can be completely exogenous, while 
demand shocks can be at least partially determined and (almost) completely offset by 
monetary policy. Thus, assenting demand shocks also to recur to escape clauses could 
undermine both CBs credibility and IT regimes.
Although these target revisions are generally comprehensive and made ex-post, they 
can also be made ex-ante, e.g., when the policy-makers know in advance that a shock will 
make them significantly miss the target. Brazil is an example of a country which uses these 
revisions, called adjusted targets. The difference between these adjusted targets and escape 
clauses are that the latter are set by CBs in advance, justifying a virtual non-fulfillment of a 
target, while adjusted targets are a forward-looking procedure, i.e., they can be used only in 
ex-post revisions of the targets, with the simultaneous definition of a new target and the 
accompanying explanation of how this new target was set (Fraga et al., 2003:38).
It is essential to append that escape clauses and target revisions cannot be viewed as a 
solution to the inherent uncertainty concerning inflation forecasting, since the accuracy on 
inflation forecasting is an essential element of IT. Finally, missing the target should not be 
seen as a signal that the entire IT strategy is being or should be abandoned. In such cases, CBs 
must explain the reasons of that target missing, in order to maintain their credibility and keep 
the IT framework quite intact.
Sixth, what policies should be chosen in order to reach the target, be it a point or a 
range? The common policy used by CBs to affect general prices is to move upward or 
downward short nominal interest rates to counterbalance respectively a higher and lower 
inflation rate than desired (Svensson, 2005:1). The policies mainly consist in a careful 
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monitoring of inflation and in preemptive or ex-post “strikes” against unwanted movements in 
inflation rates, in order for these rates not to gather momentum. Notwithstanding, as Gaiotti 
and Secchi (2004), Kriesler and Lavoie (2004) and Bibow (2005) noted, a rise in interests 
may also cause a rise in prices, at least in the short run. Bibow (2005:16), for instance, shows 
that in the case of Euroland a rise in interest rates may cause an economic and productivity 
slump that pushes inflation up. Moreover, this rise in interest rates may also have other 
adverse consequences, namely, on fiscal expenditures, for it augments squandering with debt 
service and that, together with stagnation and a rise in unemployment, probably will raise 
total government spending (Chick, 1983:318-9), prodding unfavorable expectations for 
inflation. For the rise in fiscal spending can bring about expectations of higher taxes and/or 
cuts in subsidies, leading to a fiscal supply shock and, thus, to a shock on prices.
Furthermore, Gaiotti and Secchi (2004:7-11) demonstrates that rises in interest rates 
can engender higher costs on working capital and inventories, and not only “benign” (in the 
sense of “in the right direction”, i.e., downward) consequences over demand.5 That implies at 
least a longer persistence of inflation, after corrective policies are put into use, resulting in a 
worsening of the commonly simple considered short run trade-off among output and inflation, 
and calling for more gradual policies to stabilize inflationary shocks. Another unwelcome 
effects are over mark-ups, which can go up to offset declining sales; and over productive 
capacity, moving supply curves to the left, since costs go up in the short run, reducing 
investments, with repercussions in the long run over capacity and productivity.
3. The IT Regime in Brazil: Rationale of Adoption and some Institutional Details
In the beginning of 1999, the Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) was searching for a new 
nominal anchor to stabilize expectations, after an abrupt change in the monetary policy 
regime and in the exchange rate of the real against the dollar, that is to say, the nominal 
anchor was not anymore an over-appreciated and quite stable domestic currency.6 The chosen 
option was an IT regime, which would turn the very inflation target into the new nominal 
anchor. Moreover, there was a spread of IT throughout the world and a spur for this new 
arrangement by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Therefore, Brazil adopted IT effectively since July 1st 1999. The main points of that 
framework are (Bogdanski et al., 1999:11-3; CBB, 2000): a) the chosen index would be one 
of headline instead of core inflation. The Brazilian economy experienced several price index 
manipulations at least in the three preceding decades, what conducted monetary authorities to 
opt for a full index, to gain credibility, even though the Real Plan was entering its sixth year. 
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In addition, a consumer index was chosen, because it would be well understood by the public; 
b) the inflation targets would be established on the basis of a widely known price index, the 
Broad Consumer Price Index (IPCA); c) there would be no escape clauses at least for possible 
supply shocks, what is more amazing since Brazil chose a headline inflation rate.7
Nevertheless, the CBB could adjust the target, taking into account some supply shocks as, for 
instance, the impact of administered prices and/or of market prices inertia.8 Notwithstanding, 
the CBB only recurs to adjusting its targets when they clearly appear as unattainable, given 
current inflation rates. This behavior is in line with general prescriptions of IT theory, which 
dictates a trade-off among flexibility and credibility. However, the CBB has only adjusted 
targets in order to try to maintain its credibility, albeit purporting to show that it performs its 
functions flexibly; d) the National Monetary Council (CMN), based on a proposal by the 
Finance Minister, set the inflation target as well as the tolerance intervals; e) the CBB would 
choose a point target inside a range, some percentage points above and below that point 
target;9 f) the targets – the point and the range – would refer to inflation during the period 
January-December of each year. i.e., according to the calendar year; g) the IT regime would 
begin with the targets for 1999, 2000 and 2001 set no later than June 30th 1999; and for 2002 
and subsequent years, inflation targets would be set no later than June 30th for two years 
ahead; h) the CBB would be given responsibilities and means to achieve the targets; i) in case 
the targets are breached, the CBB Governor would issue an open letter to the Finance Minister 
explaining the causes of the breach, and the measures adopted and time span required to 
ensure that current inflation returns to the established range; and j) the Monetary Policy 
Committee (Copom) would meet regularly, deciding the interest rates by a majority vote of its 
nine members, and issuing minutes explaining its decisions.
4. The Consequences of the Specific Characteristics of the Brazilian IT Regime
As a preliminary remark, Bogdanski et al. (1999:12) explained that the rationale 
behind the adoption of decreasing targets for the first three years of the new regime, 1999-
2001, but also for the next two years, 2002-2003 (see Table 1), is that there would be, in 
general, two causes for inflation: a) an inertial and, thus, protracted process; and b) a 
temporary inflation rise due to a shock, with a once and for all impact over prices. The rising 
inflation rates in the beginning of 1999 would be of the second kind, an outcome of a supply 
shock (exchange rate appreciation), with no further upward pressure. Nevertheless, they do 
not make clear why the shocks coming from the depreciation of the real would be once-and-
for-all and not require a quite extended span for realignment of prices.
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TABLE 1
BRAZIL: EFFECTIVE INFLATION RATES, TARGETS AND RANGES, IN PERCENTAGE POINTS 
(1999-2009)
YEAR INFLATION 
TARGETS
(CMN)
CHANGE IN 
INFLATION 
TARGETS
(CMN)
ADJUSTED 
TARGETS
(CMN)
RANGE
(CMN)
EFFECTIVE 
INFLATION 
RATES
(IPCA – IBGE)
TARGETS 
FULFILLMENT
1999 8.00 ±2.00 8.94 Fulfilled – upper 
limit
2000 6.00 ±2.00 5.97 Fulfilled –central 
target
2001 4.00 ±2.00 7.67 Non-fulfilled
2002 3.50 ±2.00 12.53 Non-fulfilled
2003 3.25 4.00 ±2.50 9.30 Fulfilled – upper 
limit
2004 3.75 5.50 ±2.50 7.60 Fulfilled – upper 
limit
2005 4.50 ±2.50 5.69 Fulfilled – upper 
limit
2006 4.50 ±2.00 3.14 Fulfilled – lower 
limit
2007 4.50 ±2.00 4.46 Fulfilled –central 
target
2008 4.50 ±2.00 5.90 Fulfilled – upper 
limit
2009 4.50 ±2.00
Sources: Conjuntura Econômica, june 2007; Banco Central do Brasil; Agostini and Ohno, 2005; Fraga et al.
(2003).
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In addition to the option for accentuated decreasing targets, we should also oppose the 
inflexibility of all the main points of the framework, in Brazil. For, as we will show, the IT 
regime has been adopted in Brazil as a rule, not as a framework, in stark opposition to some 
of the principal proponents of that regime. That is to say, the BCB has not considered 
sufficiently the consequences of its choice of interest rates (Wray, 1998) over employment
and economic growth in the short and long runs, clearly preferring to attain some minor gains 
in inflation rate – of one annual percent or even less – to try more stable policies in the long 
run, with more investment, growth, employment, productivity, fewer supply bottlenecks, etc., 
with all the consequences of these achievements over long run rates of growth and inflation. 
Moreover, it has not been considering the fiscal consequences of raises in interest rates, since: 
a) the total amount of financial expenditures augments; b) the burden of the debt also rises, 
together with a relative fall in overall tax revenues; c) disbursements because of 
unemployment increase; d) average GDP growth decreases, increasing the debt/GDP ratio and 
the risks of fiscal dominance, unless counterbalanced by strong measures to augment fiscal 
revenues (rises in tax burdens) and/or to diminish fiscal expenses (with steep and quite 
comprehensive reductions of government disbursements – Safatle and Romero, 2005a; 
2005b), also because the government knows that beyond a threshold (that is lower for 
DEVCs, when compared to DCs and their international currencies) an “increase in the real 
interest rate also increases the probability of default on the debt… [making] domestic debt 
less attractive”(Blanchard, 2004:3).
We should also not forget the consequences of exchange rate fluctuations over 
inflation. Minella et al. (2003a:24-5) stress exchange rate volatility as one of the three most 
important challenges for monetary policy in DEVCs which adopt IT, together with the 
building up of credibility and some control over changes in relative prices. As we saw in 
section 2, domestic currency depreciation may have an important impact over prices, as an 
outcome of the pass-through from higher import prices of intermediary and final products as 
well as from higher demand and prices for exports. Another major effect of sudden 
depreciations of the domestic currency is over the balance sheets of domestic firms, because 
of the mismatch between revenues in domestic currency and debts in foreign currencies.10 On 
the other hand, an appreciation of the currency, in spite of having short term advantageous 
consequences over inflation rates – because of symmetric downward impacts on import and 
export prices – can make the domestic economy less competitive, what might cause 
unfavorable expectations over CBs reserves on the medium or long runs, if this appreciation 
is not sustainable. Once more, the central theme here is that DEVCs do not issue reserve 
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currencies. This makes obligatory big and stable reserves in the long run, in order not to 
experience sudden and disrupting speculative movements against their currencies. As well 
known, the level of reserves functions as an insurance against major capital outflows in a 
financially integrated world, strongly reducing exchange rate volatility.
The neglect of these points might explain why the IT regime in Brazil did not achieve 
its targets in 2001 and 2002, and only attained it in 2003 and 2004 after significant upward 
revisions, in the upper limit of the new, adjusted targets. We should also stress that only in 
2000 the CBB hit the central target, while in 1999 and 2005 only the upper limit was attained 
(with a minor and not needed adjusted target in this last year, given the unjustified quest of 
the CBB to reach the central target, through high interest rates and strong exchange rate 
appreciation). However, Minella et al. (2003b:116-23) can certainly affirm that IT in Brazil 
has been successful in anchoring expectations, reducing inflation persistence and, thus, 
controlling inflation rates with an accentuated upward bias.
The market expectations of rises in interest rates and of a dampening of any higher 
output growth introduce a very strong antigrowth bias, more puzzling when we consider that 
the country is a DEVC, thus with a more volatile macroeconomic environment (Fraga et al.,
2003:4,8,31). Another reason for this antigrowth bias is the asymmetric effect of supply 
shocks, with inflationary shocks having a greater repercussion over prices than deflationary 
shocks, as a consequence of the downward price rigidities. Consequently, this long run anti-
growth bias is self-reinforcing, for the persistence of many bottlenecks together with lower 
productivity and more obsolete means of production result in higher prices and stricter limits 
to production growth and to policies, etc. Thus, it would be wise to prescribe higher central 
targets and/or wider ranges, which reflect not only higher past inflation but also a greater 
vulnerability to shocks.
It is essential to return now to a point briefly mentioned in the introduction, namely, 
the high interest rates long before and after IT implementation, in an example of the 
predominance of financial interests, producing since long ago (even now, in February 2006) 
the highest real interest rates in the world. Agostini and Ohno (2005) highlight that, since 
March 1975, the nominal interest rate did not fall below 15%, but these high nominal interest 
rates have been many times a must in Brazil, in response to high inflation rates. 
Notwithstanding, the nominal annual interest rates remained above 19% during the whole first 
part of the Real Plan (July 1994 to December 1998), with real annual interest rates of no less 
than 15% in the entire period, with the exception of August 1998 (12.8%).
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Initially, the reason for these unusual interest rates was that the economy was in the 
aftermath of the Real Plan and of a very long period of high inflation. But afterwards, a high 
real interest rate was considered essential to maintain a net capital inflow, in order to sustain 
the pegged exchange rate, transformed in nominal anchor of the Brazilian currency, until this 
over-appreciated anchor collapsed in January 1999. Subsequently, interest rates were set high 
to avoid an inflation/exchange rate depreciation spiral, with huge capital outflows. Since IT 
implementation, it was kept high to maintain inflation rates inside the range, if possible, as in 
2005, hitting the central target in spite of the loss in economic growth. That is why it is useful 
to consider history and former institutions when analyzing some events, policies and 
institutional building-ups, especially when one considers that financial and banking interests 
have been given predominance among the Brazilian economy for a long time before the long 
process which almost led to hyperinflation and which began in the 1970s (Lessa and Fiori, 
1983).
This is a way to understand the several institutional traps rigged in the outset of IT and 
the great obstacles, if not “impossibilities”, to surpass them. However, we would like to 
emphasize the crucial importance of three additional factors: 1) the huge deficits which led to 
a net public debt/GDP ratio of 52%, in the end of 2005, i.e., a fiscal, institutional and 
historical cause,11 with consequences in terms of an already explained insatiable search for 
increases in fiscal revenues and for cuts in public expenditures; 2) the permanent difficulties 
in the BP, also a perennial institutional cause (Strachman and Vasconcelos, 2001); and 3) the 
indexation of administered prices to the General Price Indexes (FGV), “almost condemning 
[the economy] to the perpetuation of the prime interest rate in extremely high levels” 
(Agostini and Ohno, 2005:2). As the consequences of the first two causes are already clear, 
we now detail the third one.
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In Brazil, the pass-through of administered prices (of 25% after one year of 
depreciation) has been expected to be two times higher than that of market prices (12%; 
Minella et al., 2003a:25). This is an effect of the contracts negotiated for the privatized 
utilities, some service firms and the prices of some other regulated sectors, that brought about 
the side effect by which the prices of oil by-products, fixed telephone, residential electricity 
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and public transportation are partly indexed to the US dollar, resulting in a higher degree of 
persistence of past inflation. As a consequence, these prices have risen persistently above 
market prices, contributing strongly towards higher rates of inflation and to a continuous 
misguided effort to decrease market prices to counterbalance the higher rates in the 
administered ones (see Figure 1).12 This is another institutional component which has led to a 
permanent quest for low inflation in an environment in which a third of the prices, with a 
tendency towards augmentation, rise systematically above average inflation. Moreover, these 
prices are not subject to the main effects of the anti-inflationary policies directed towards the 
other two thirds of the prices. These institutional characteristics result in a permanent bias 
against investments and economic growth, besides bringing about an increased rejection to the 
inflexibility of IT in the country.
One additional feature is that the information and studies which underpin decisions 
about the prime interest rates are at least very feeble and at most non-existent. Nakano (2004) 
shows that the CBB have few or no information about many sectors, their costs, productivity, 
idle capacity and the consequences of these variables over general inflation, investments, the 
“output gap”, etc. The CBB resorts to studies made by big banks and financial institutions on 
prospective inflation, with minor participation of agents from the productive sector. These 
institutions are, thus, constituted as preferential interlocutors of the CBB, in a strange relation, 
since they are clearly favorable to high interest rates and want to know beforehand the future 
interest rates.
A final remark is that the CBB has lowered its level of transparency in its last months’ 
minutes, perhaps because of the difficulties to explain the incoherence of increasing interest 
rates even when current inflation is inside the target range and not rising. This is why many 
economists defend that the CBB should make public the models upon which it bases its 
policies, mainly because since September 2004 the minutes of the Copom meetings have 
become increasingly obscure and in contradiction with other minutes, having in many times 
accomplished a strange unanimity, even stranger when there is no reason to tighten the 
monetary policy. This is another example of the very biased institutional flexibility with 
which IT is followed in Brazil.
5. Conclusions
Several necessary institutional transformations appear as a logical conclusion of the 
previous sections. First, the CBB – as, for instance, the Bank of Canada – should announce 
only a range as its target, and not a point, for the pursuit of a point leads almost inevitably to 
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more frequent changes in monetary policies, with a more stringent bias. The CBB should thus 
use all the stipulated range to accommodate certain demand and supply fluctuations, etc., in 
order to achieve low levels of inflation without compromising economic growth by any 
margin if not necessary. Second, the definition of the very target should be more flexible, in 
order not to impair economic growth and development without necessity, also taking into 
account that Brazil is a DEVC.
Brazil should also pursuit a core inflation target, with the exclusion of administered 
prices and, perhaps, of some food prices – as, for example, in the case of the USA – from the 
inflation target. A fourth suggestion is the adoption of sectoral indexes for price adjustments, 
as a current proposal by the Ministry of Energy. This measure could help to curb the rises of 
administered prices, bringing inflation down even if these prices continue to take part in the 
official inflation target. Fifth, it would be important to increase the flexibility of the temporal 
target, changing it from a calendar year to the accumulated inflation in 12 months or, better, 
with 24 or 36 months to converge the actual inflation rate to the target, as in New Zealand, 
Chile, UK and Canada.
Sixth, the CBB must improve its research scope and improve urgently its own prices 
forecasts, in order to stop depending on those from market institutions. At the same time, such 
improvement in its research base could bring new information and help to direct expectations 
to the inflation target.13 Seventh, there should be an increase in the number of participants and 
a change in the composition of the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom). This would lead to 
the inclusion of participants from industrial sectors, trade unions, etc., widening the interests 
represented in the definition of monetary policies.
Eighth, CBB and Copom must urgently augment the level of transparency of their 
decisions, in order to be more in line with the prescriptions of the main proponents of IT. This 
would lead to an increase in credibility, mainly if combined with more flexibility and 
wisdom.14 Ninth, we propose open individual votes in the Copom meetings, facilitating the 
identification of personal stances in terms of economic policy, what would help to increase 
the credibility of the CBB.
Tenth, we support the adoption of an IT regime with only implicit inflation targets, as 
currently in the USA and EU (Greenspan, 2004). This would allow more flexibility, for the 
CBB would pursuit low inflation rates, but with no obligation to achieve any target.
References
Agostini, A., and Ohno, F.H. Metas de Inflação vs. Política Monetária. Research Report GRC Visão. Curitiba, May 2005.
19
Arestis, P.; Caporale, G.M.; and Cipollini, A. “Does inflation targeting affect the trade-off between output gap and inflation 
variability?” Manchester School, 2002, 70(4), 528-45.
Arestis, P., and Sawyer, M. “Reinventing fiscal policy”. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, fall 2003, 26(1), 3-25.
Bernanke, B.S.; Laubach, T.; Mishkin, F.S.; and Posen, A.S. Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Bibow, J. Refocusing the ECB on Output Stabilization and Growth through Inflation Targeting? Annandale-on-Hudson, NY, 
1999.
Blanchard, O. Fiscal Dominance and Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Brazil. National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER). Working Paper Series, 10389, March 2004.
Bogdanski, J.; Tombini, A.A.; and Werlang, S.R.C.Implementing Inflation Targeting in Brazil. Banco Central do Brasil. 
Working Paper Series, n. 1, July 2000.
Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) “Issues in the adoption of an inflation targeting framework in Brazil”. In Blejer, M.I., Ize, A., 
Leone, A.M., and Werlang, S.R.C. (eds.) Inflation Targeting in Practice: Strategic and Operational Issues and 
Application to Emerging Market Economies. Washington, DC: IMF, 2000, 87-94.
Chang, H.J., and Grabel, I. Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy Manual. London: Zed Books, 2004.
Chick, V. Macroeconomics after Keynes: A Reconsideration of the General Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1983.
Elster, J. “Social norms and economic theory”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1989, 3(4), 99-117.
Fontana, G., and Palacio-Vera, A. Is Long-Run Price Stability and Short-Run Output Stabilization All that Monetary Policy 
Can Aim for? The Third Australian Society of Heterodox Economists Conference. University of New South Wales, 
2004. 
Fraga, A.; Goldfajn, I.; and Minella, A. Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies. Banco Central do Brasil. 
Working Paper Series, 76, June 2003.
Gaiotti, E., and Secchi, A. Is There a Cost Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission? An Investigation into the Pricing 
Behaviour of 2,000 Firms. Temi di discussione, Banca D’Itália, 525, December 2004.
Greenspan, A. Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy. Remarks at the Meetings of the American Economic Association, 
San Diego, Cal., January 3, 2004
Johnson, S. “ECB keeps rates on hold”: Financial Times, August 4, 2005 (Internet edition).
Keynes, J.M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmillan, 1973 [1936].
Keynes, J.M. Activities 1929-1931: Rethinking Employment and Unemployment Policies. The Collected Writings of John 
Maynard Keynes. v. 20. London: Macmillan, 1981 [1929-1931].
Kriesler, P., and Lavoie, M. The New View on Monetary Policy: The New Consensus and its Post-Keynesian Critique. The 
Third Australian Society of Heterodox Economists Conference. University of New South Wales, 2004. 
Lessa, C., and Fiori, J.L. Relendo a Política Econômica: as Falácias do Nacionalismo Popular do Segundo Vargas. 
IEI/UFRJ Discussion Paper n. 30, 1983.
Mahadeva, L., and Sterne, G. “Inflation target as a stabilization device”. Manchester School, 2002, 70(4), 619-50.
Mendonça, H.F. Independência do Banco Central, Âncoras Nominais e Coordenação de Políticas. Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2001.
Minella, A.; de Freitas, P.S.; Goldfajn, I.; and Muinhos, M.K. Inflation Targeting in Brazil: Constructing Credibility under 
Exchange Rate Volatility. Banco Central do Brasil. Working Paper Series, 77, July 2003a.
Minella, A.; de Freitas, P.S.; Goldfajn, I.; and Muinhos, M.K. “Inflation targeting in Brazil: lessons and challenges”. BIS 
Papers, n. 19, p. 106-133, October 2003b.
Mishkin, F., and Schmidt-Hebbel, K. “A decade of inflation targeting in the world: what do we know and what do we need to 
know?”. In Loayza, N., and Soto, R. (eds.) Inflation Targeting: Design, Performance, Challenges. Santiago: Central 
Bank of Chile, 2002, 171-219.
20
Muscatelli, V.A.; Tirelli, P.; and Trecroci, C. “Does institutional change really matter? Inflation targets, central bank reform 
and interest rate policy in the OECD countries”. Manchester School, 2002, 70(4), 487-527.
Nakano, Y. “Deve-se levantar o ‘véu financeiro’ e redescobrir a economia”. Valor Econômico, Agosto 31, 2004 (Internet 
edition).
Runde, J.; Munir, K.; Jones, M.; Orlikowski, W.; and Nikolychuk, L. On Rules, Routines and the Adoption of Technological 
Product Innovations. The Cambridge-MIT Institute. Cambridge, UK, 2005.
Strachman, E., and Vasconcelos, M.R. An Institutional Analysis of some Monetary Issues in Developing Economies. The 
Conference 2001 of the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE), November 8-11, 2001.
Svensson, L.O. Further Developments of Inflation Targeting. Prepared for “Inflation Targeting: Implementation, 
Communication and Effectiveness”. Workshop at Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm, June 10-12, 2005.
Vega, M., and Winkelried, D. Inflation Targeting and Inflation Behavior: A Successful Story? Cambridge, UK, 2005.
Wray, L.R. Understanding Modern Money: The Key to Full Employment and Price Stability. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
1998.
Notes
1 Preliminary versions are in the Proceedings of the EAEPE Conference 2005, in Bremen; 9th 
Workshop of the Research Network in Alternative Macroeconomic Policies, in Berlin; and 
AFEE 2006 Annual Meeting, in Boston, Mass.
2 We can mention the diminishing efficiencies of product and labor markets and the lower 
effort than needed to be made to increase these efficiencies, since prices can always escalate; 
the difficulties in monitoring one’s own costs and also suppliers’ and competitors´ prices; the 
reduction in real wages and thus, the distributional effects, since wages are not adjusted as fast 
as the majority of prices; the attempt of policy-makers to control inflation through a lasting 
deflationary policy, with high interest rates and conservative fiscal policies; the curtailment of 
the terms of financial assets, given the higher uncertainty about the future value of long term 
debts; the tax distortions and/or governments’ fiscal difficulties; etc.
3 Bernanke et al. (1999:28) stress that one way to achieve flexibility and transparency is to 
choose an index with data compiled by an agency completely independent of the monetary 
authorities.
4 “[T]he Brazilian economy has been hit by frequent and large shocks. Most of them are 
related to its position as an emergent market economy – high volatility of country risk 
premium and of the exchange rate – and to some structural transformations that led to a 
change in relative prices. The volatility of the inflation rate and exchange rate in Brazil is still 
one of the highest in inflation targeting economies.”(Minella et al., 2003b:131). “Therefore, 
exchange rate volatility is an important source of inflation variability. The design of the 
inflation-targeting framework has to take into account this issue to avoid that a possible non-
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fulfillment of inflation targets as a result of exchange rate volatility may reduce the credibility 
of the central bank.”(Minella et al., 2003a:29). 
5 Thus, rising interests seem to “imply an overall adverse effect on prices… which would 
have partly counterbalanced the disinflationary effect operating through the demand side. 
While hardly enough to change the overall effect of monetary policy on prices over the 
medium run, this impact may not be without relevance.”(Gaiotti and Secchi, 2004:25).
6 The average exchange rate moved from R$ 1.21/US$ 1 in the first days of 1999, to R$ 
1.96/US$ 1 on Feb. 1st 1999, to R$ 2.16/US$ 1 on March 3rd, then dropped to R$ 1.72/US$ 1 
on March 31st, some days after the new Board of Directors of CBB took office.
7 Minella et al. (2003b:130). Bogdanski (et al., 1999:13) add: “The combination of the use of 
headline inflation and the absence of escape clauses justifies the adoption of the relatively 
wide 2-percentage point tolerance interval around the central target, and certainly makes the 
announced targets much tighter than they may initially appear.” These remarks are 
astonishing since this “wide” 2% tolerance interval is designed for a DEVC, with, as we 
explained, a great possibility of supply shocks, because of bottlenecks, foreign exchange 
shortage, development requirements, etc. See also CBB (2000:92).
8 Fraga et al. (2003:33). Another institutional issue in the IT framework in Brazil is the so-
called administered (administered by contract and/or monitored) prices, which increased 
above the other (market) prices (see Figure 1). The administered prices are regulated by the 
federal government and/or public agencies, and include oil by-products, fixed telephone, 
residential electricity and public transportation. Its weight in the IPCA was 30.8% in June 
2002. As a consequence of a flaw in the privatization process in Brazil, the inflation rate 
indexes which adjust administered prices are the IGP-M and the IGP-DI (General Market 
Price Index, composed with a weight of 60% by the Wholesale Prices Index – IPA, an index 
in which exchange rate variations and the international prices of many tradables, imported or 
exported by Brazil, have strong repercussions) (Minella et al., 2003b). These choices of
indexes occurred as a means to attract foreign capital and guarantee a more stable rentability 
(also for domestic capital), resulting in that important fluctuations in the exchange rate have 
significant consequences over the administered prices, although in many cases they do not
have a significative participation in the costs of these firms. Thus, exchange rate fluctuations 
gather an unjustified momentum over the official index for the Brazilian IT regime, the IPCA, 
and even over the very IGPs, through the Consumer Prices Index – IPC, in a vicious circle. 
All this albeit it is common that costs of firms responsible for these administered goods and 
services are mainly in reais. Here we perceive the influence of economic interests over the 
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build-up of an institutional mechanism with many flaws, by no means properly regulated, and 
with repercussions over inflation and, thus, growth of an entire country.
9 This band should not be too wide, in order not to be too lenient with inflation. But, as a 
result of the greater volatility of the exchange rate, interest rates, and risk premium in Brazil, 
the CBB broadened the tolerance interval from ±2% to ±2.5%, for 2003 and 2004 (Minella et 
al., 2003b:130-1).
10 “Depreciations in emerging market countries are particularly dangerous because they can 
trigger a financial crisis… These countries have much of their debt denominated in foreign 
currency; when the currency depreciates, the debt burden of domestic firms increases. Since 
assets are typically denominated in domestic currency and so do not increase in value, net 
worth declines. This deterioration in balance sheets then increases adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems, which leads to financial instability and a sharp decline in investment and 
economic activity.”(Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002:192)
11 These deficits, though, had grown fast in a clear case of fiscal irresponsibility, in the first 
four years of the Real Plan and of Cardoso’s government. Afterwards, the federal government 
changed its fiscal policies in order to honor its debt.
12 The weight of the administered prices in the IPCA grew from 17% in January 1991 to 28% 
in August 1999, reaching 30.8% in June 2002, and circa 1/3 in the first semester of 2005 
(Minella et al., 2003b). From June 1999 to May 2005, administered prices rose 124.3% 
against 54.3% of market prices, with great influences of the Wholesale Prices Index, with a 
weight of 60%. In addition, the rise of administered prices in 2005 was 9%, against an 
inflation rate of 5.7%; and, finally, for 2006 the expected rise in those prices is 5.3%, against 
an inflation target of 4.5%.
13 See similar prescriptions for the Bank of England made by Keynes (1981:263-267), in the 
Macmillan Committee (1929-31).
14 Greenspan (2004); Keynes (1981:262-263).
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ABSTRACT
The paper shows the advantages and handicaps of implementing an inflation target (IT) 
regime, from a Post-Keynesian and, thus, an institutional stance. It is Post-Keynesian as long 
as it does not perceive any benefit in the mainstream split between monetary and fiscal 
policies. And it is institutional insofar as it assumes that there are several ways of 
implementing a policy, such that the chosen one is determined by historical factors, as it is 
illustrated by the Brazilian case. One could even support IT policies if their targets were seen 
just as “focusing devices” guiding economic policy, notwithstanding other targets, as, in the 
short run, output growth and employment and, in the long run, technology and human 
development. Nevertheless, an IT is not necessary, although it can be admitted, mainly if the
target is hidden from the public, in order to increase the flexibility of the Central Bank.
RESUMO
Mostram-se as vantagens e desvantagens da implementação de um regime de metas de 
inflação, de uma perspectiva pós-keynesiana e institucional. Pós-keynesiana pois não crê em 
benefício na separação entre políticas monetária e fiscal prescrita pelo mainstream. E 
institucional porque assume que há vários modos para implementar políticas; assim, o 
escolhido é determinado por fatores históricos, como ilustrado pelo caso brasileiro. Pode-se 
até apoiar metas de inflação, desde que estas sejam vistas apenas como “focusing devices”, 
guiando políticas, mas considerando outros objetivos, como, no curto prazo, o produto e o 
emprego e, no longo, o desenvolvimento tecnológico e humano. Ressalte-se que metas de 
inflação não são necessárias, apesar de serem admissíveis, sobretudo se mantidas escondidas 
do público, funcionando apenas como um foco e dando flexibilidade aos BCs.
